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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contracts-Distinction Between Offer and Preliminary
Negotiation
For a proposal to be turned into a binding contract by an acceptance,
it must, as a general rule, be made in contemplation of legal conse-
quences. When made with these intentions, it is a good offer; other-
wise it becomes what is commonly called a preliminary negotiation.
The difficulty of drawing an exact line between these two is recognized
by the authorities everywhere.' In deciding if legal consequences were
contemplated, the courts seek to determine whether the party making
the proposal intended to create a contract upon acceptance of the pro-
posal or intended merely to negotiate for one.2  Fact situations, from
which offer-preliminary negotiations difficulties may arise, include those
based on (1) invitations to deal, (2) advertising circulars, (3) esti-
mates, (4) oral agreement on terms to be reduced to writing, and (5)
agreements with one or more terms left open. In a recent federal case,3
the court was confronted with this type of problem.
There, the plaintiff expressed an interest in purchasing coal from
the defendant for the 1947-48 burning season. The defendant quoted
his coal prices, but refused to sign his name on a memorandum on which
plaintiff had written these prices, until the word "quotation" was written
across the top. Defendant increased price on second shipment. On
plaintiff's refusal to pay the increase the defendant stopped shipments
and this suit for breach of contract ensued. In holding the defendant's
quotations were not an offer, but rather an invitation to make an offer,
the court took note of several factors. Among these was the fact that
plaintiff had knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry as
to contracts of this nature4 and the pendency of the wage agreement and
"Frequently negotiations for a contract are begun between parties by general
expression of willingness to enter into a bargain upon stated terms and yet the
natural construction of the words and conduct of the parties is rather that they
are inviting offers or suggesting the terms of a possible future bargain, than mak-
ing positive offers. . ... Language that at first sight may seem an offer may
be found merely preliminary in its character." 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §27 (Rev.
ed. 1936).
2El Reno Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Stocking, 293 IIl. 494, 127 N. W. 642
(1920) ; Inr re Kaufmann's Estate, 137 Pa. Super. 88, 8 A. 2d 472 (1939); Wind-
sor Mfg. Co. v. Makransky & Sons, 322 Pa. 466, 186 Atl. 84 (1936).
Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231 (M. D. Pa. 1950).
' The court found ". . . that the general custom in the anthracite industry was
not to enter into contracts for the sale of coal, wholesale, over any long period
of time .... When price quotations are made it is not considered in the industry
as an offer or sale, but as an invitation to the trade to submit orders-offers to
buy-which may or may not be accepted." Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231,
233 (M. D. Pa. 1950).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
consequent price increase.5
As a general rule, a price quotation, whether in the form of an
advertising circular or an invitation to deal, is not an offer. The famous
case of Nebraska Seed Company v. Harsh6 dearly sustains this point.
However, under some circumstances it may be an offer, particularly is
this true where, in answer to a definite request for an offer, a price
quotation is sent that accurately describes the property and states definite
contractual terms.7  North Carolina agrees with the above rules,8 with
the possible exception of one case,9 which is explainable on its facts.
In that case, the defendant sent the following telegram: "Can offer you
extra force at $65 per month. Will want you at once to ditch D. & N.
road and R. & G. Answer quick. Job will last all the year." Plaintiff
was discharged eleven days after starting to work. When sued for
breach of contract, the defendant contended that the telegram did not
constitute an offer, but was a preliminary negotiation and that if a con-
tract existed it should be construed subject to the rules of the company.10
The jury found for the plaintiff and on appeal, while affirming, the
court explained the terminology of the telegram by saying--"The argu-
ment .. .that by using the potential 'can offer,' Elmore (defendant's
agent) did not make a positive offer of employment, but only intended
to open negotiations, is entirely destroyed by the undisputed evidence
that the plaintiff accepted the offer by wire, reported for duty and
was placed in charge of the work and prosecuted it for eleven days until
discharged." While the result in this case is sound, the court's inter-
pretation of the telegram seems wrong. It would appear that the tele-
gram from the defendant's agent was not an offer. The telegram merely
informed plaintiff that a certain job for a definite length of time and at
I "For sometime prior and subsequent to July 1, 1947, the anthracite coal
operators and miners were negotiating a wage contract. It was generally known
in the industry that the adjustment would be upward and the wage increase would
be immediately absorbed and reflected in the price per ton of anthracite coal."
Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231, 233 (M. D. Pa. 1950).
698 Neb. 89, 152 N. W. 310 (1915) (quotation of seed price not an offer).
7 Maedler Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Ore. 562, 220 Pac. 155 (1923);
1 WLiisrox, CoNR aAcs §27 (Rev. ed. 1936).
8 Clark Manufacturing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 152 N. C. 157,
67 S. E. 329 (1910) ("Will you accept receivership... ?" Held: inquiry as to
whether he would take job or not); Cherokee Tanning Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 143 N. C. 376, 55 S. E. 777 (1906) (A to B: "Kindly advise .
by wire ... if you can use about 1500 creosote barrels . . . at 95 cents each. .. ."
Held: no contract as there was no offer, stating an . . . offer must be distinct
as such and not merely an invitation to enter into negotiations upon certain
basis . . .); Walser v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 114 N. C. 440, 19 S. E.
366 (1894) ("Will you accept eight one-half all two-fifty drills if we can get
offer... ?" Held: trade inquiry).9 King v. Seaboard Air Line R. R., 140 N. C. 433, 53 S. E. 37 (1906).
10 The company offered proof that it was their policy not to hire any person
for a long period of time, but rather to hire on a month-to-month basis. Plaintiff
knew of this policy, but contended and the jury agreed, that this was a special
contract not subject to the general rules.
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a stated pay was open with the defendant, but on the surface seemed
to lack that expression of willingness on defendant's part necessary to
make an offer. Plaintiff by appearing for work made the offer, and
defendant by putting him to work, accepted the offer creating a contract
containing the terms set forth in the telegram, they being the only
ones mentioned. By its holding in this case the court sustained its
previous rulings that it is the manifested intent that controls, rather
than the language used.
Similarly, when a party receives an estimate, he, by the majority
rule, cannot by "accepting" the estimate make a binding contract. The
word "estimate" is usually construed to mean "more or less"'" and
unless the party makes his estimate in the form of a bid for the work,
he has not made an offer which can be accepted. No North Carolina
authority on this point has been discovered. However it would seem
that our court, in view of its position when confronted with analogous
situations," would follow the majority view.
The problem of distinguishing between an offer and a preliminary
negotiation presents itself in a somewhat different manner when the
person making the proposal suggests, before a binding transaction is
entered into, that the parol agreement be reduced to writing later. The
courts are then called upon to determine if this suggestion makes an
otherwise good offer a contract upon acceptance, or makes the complete
transaction a preliminary negotiation. When faced with this question,
most courts have held that where the material terms' 3 of the proposal
have been definitely understood and accepted, the subsequent failure to
embody such terms in a written contract does not prevent the agree-
ment from being binding on the parties.1 4  This is particularly true
where a draft is viewed by the parties as merely a convenient memorial
or record of their previous contract. However, if a draft be viewed as
the final act of their negotiations, there is no contract until its execution.
The courts in endeavoring to find which attitude is present in any par-
ticular case, should consider numerous factors among which are (1)
whether the contract is of that class which is usually found in writing,
(2) whether it is of such nature as to need a formal writing for its
full expression, (3) whether it has few or many details, (4) whether
the amount is large or small, (5) whether it is a common or unusual
contract and (6) whether the negotiations themselves indicate that a
written draft is contemplated as the final conclusion of the negotiations.
11Robbins v. Hill, 259 S. W. 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
12 See note 8 supra.
11 It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss what terms are or are not
material to constitute a good offer.
" Atlantic Terra Cotta Co. v. Chesapeake Terra Cotta Co., 96 Conn. 88, 113
Atl. 156 (1921); Priest v. Oehler, 328 Mo. 590, 41 S. W. 2d 783 (1931).
1950]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The North Carolina court has taken these factors into consideration
in several cases.15
On the other hand, if a party in the course of his negotiations has
omitted or has failed to get an agreement on all the material terms of
his proposal, then a contractual relationship cannot come into being.10
As a general rule, where some material term is left open to be decided
upon later, there is no contract.17 Yet, the existence of an election,
to be exercised within prescribed limits by one of the parties, in regard
to a term of the offer does not vitiate it for uncertainty.' 8 The North
Carolina court in agreeing with this rule in Elks v. North State Insur-
ance Co.19 said, "The offer must not merely be complete in terms, but
the terms must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine
ultimately whether the contract has been performed or not."
From these cases and those of other jurisdictions, it appears that
in order for the courts to distinguish between an offer and a preliminary
negotiation they must be able to answer these questions: first, has the
party making the proposal sufficiently named all the material terms
needed in the contract; second, has he put his proposal in a form show-
ing no mental hesitation or reservation on his part. In seeking to
answer these questions and thereby ultimately arrive at the true inten-
tions of the parties, it is fundamental that the court put itself, as nearly
as possible, in the same position the parties were in at the time of their
negotiations. To do this will require a complete and thorough under-
standing of (1) the subject matter of the contract, (2) the contem-
plated acts of the parties, (3) the relationship between the parties, (4)
the general custom and practice of the trade and (5) the circumstances
under which the parties were then acting.
ROLAND C. BRASWELL.
15 Wilkin v. Vass Cotton Mills, 176 N. C. 72, 97 S. E. 151 (1918) (contract to
buy cotton goods held good, the court finding that the negotiations of the parties
indicated they expected to be bound before reducing terms to writing); Billings
v. Wilby, 175 N. C. 571, 96 S. E. 50 (1918) (contract to put in sewer line held
good without being put in formal draft, this being the usual contract made for
this type work) ; Gooding v. Moore, 150 N. C. 195, 63 S. E. 895 (1909)
(negotiations showed that parties intended contract should arise immediately, the
court stating, "When the parties to an oral contract contemplate a subsequent
reduction of it to writing, as a matter of convenience and prudence and not
as a condition precedent, it is binding upon them, though the intent to formally
express the agreement in writing was never effectuated.") ; Teal v. Templeton,
149 N. C. 32, 62 S. E. 737 (1908) (oral rental contract held good without writing,
it being the accepted rule that a lease for three years or less need not be in
writing).
"United States v. P. J. Carlin Const Co., 224 Fed. 859 (2d Cir. 1915)
Rushing v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 224 Fed. 74 (10th Cir. 1915).
17 Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F. 2d 385 (10th Cir. 1931); A. 0.
Anderson and Co. v. Texas Co., 279 Fed. 76 (2d Cir. 1922).
" McNeely v. Carter, 23 N. C. 141 (1840) (contract to sell cotton under
which seller was to set the price by selection of a date and one of three towns,
the price at that place to be the selling price).
" 159 N. C. 619, 75 S. E. 808 (1912).
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